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<election if t1w will be helrl valirl is not a question for deter-
mination on this appeal. Nor an~ we here coneerned with 
the legality oE the eharitable bequest under a valid will. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Carter, ~r., Traynor, J·., and Schauer, J., 
eoncurred. 
Edmonds, .J., and Spenee, J., eoneurred m the judgment. 
[S. F. No. 18442. In Bank. Dec. 18, 1951.] 
'fHE OI'fY AND COUNTY O:b' SAN FRANCISCO et a.l., 
Petitioners, v. 'fHE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE CITY 
AND COUN'l'Y OF SAN FRANCISCO, Respondent. 
[S. 11'. No. 18443. In Bank. Dec. 18, 1951.] 
METHOPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Peti-
tioner, v. 'l'HE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE CITY 
AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO et al., Re-
spondents. 
[1] Prohibition-When Writ Lies.-A writ of prohibition is an 
appropriate remedy to arrest the proceedings in a court whPn 
they are without or in excess of its jurisdiction and there is 
not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course 
of law. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1102, 1103.) 
[2] Discovery-Inspection-Power of Reviewing Court.-Notwith-
standing that the superior court has jurisdiction to grant or 
deny an inspection of documents and data claimed to be in 
records of official proceedings of a municipal civil service com-
mission (Code Civ. Proc., § 1000), a reviewing court may act 
in a proper case when it appears that otherwise a failure of 
justice will occur in a matter of public importance by a wrong-
ful or excessive exercise of jurisdiction. 
[3] !d.-Inspection-Power of Reviewing Court.-To leave the 
matter of an unauthorized order for inspection of confidential 
matter for possible correction on appeal would be too late, 
would render that remedy inadequate, and would result in a 
failure of justice. 
[1] See 21 Cal.Jur. 583, 584; 42 Am.Jur. 144, 156. 
[2] See 9 Cal.Jur. 499; 17 Am.Jur. 8. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Prohibition, §§ 11, 16(1); [2-4) Dis-
covery, § 7. 
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[ 4] !d.-Inspection-Prohibition.-A writ of prohibition will issue 
to restrain enforcement of an order of court for inspection 
of documents and data claimed to be the records of official 
proceedings conducted by a municipal civil service commission 
and used improperly in fixing the compensation of classified 
employees on a parity with those in private industry, where 
the information sought was solicited from private employers 
on the written promise that its source would be held in confi.-
dence, and could not otherwise be obtained, and where the 
revelation of the source of the information would foment 
disturbance in both public and private employment. (Code 
Civ. Proc., §§ 1000, 1881(5), 1888, 1892; Pol. Code, § 1032.) 
PROCEEDING in prohibition to restrain enforcement of 
an order for inspection of documents. Writ granted. 
Dion R. Holm, City Attorney, and Norman Sanford Wolff, 
Deputy City Attorney, for Petitioners in S. F. No. 18442. 
Frank J. Hennessy and Kay Kimmell, United States Attor-
neys, William S. Tyson, United States Solicitor, Bessie Mar-
golin, Assistant United States Solicitor, Kenneth C. Robertson, 
Regional Attorney, James F. Scott, Senior United States At-
torney, Fred N. Howser and Edmund G. Brown, Attorneys 
General, Hartwell H. Linney, Chief Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, Wilmer Vv. Morse and James E. Sabine, Deputy Attor-
neys General, Sullivan, Roche, Johnson & Farraher, Long & 
I.Jevitt, George Rugland, Knight, Boland & Riordan, F. Eldred 
Boland, .John H. Riordan and John H. Riordan, Jr., as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Petitioners in S. F. No. 18442. 
Knight, Boland & Riordan, F. Eldred Boland, John H. 
Riordan and John H. Riordan, Jr. for Petitioner in S. F. No. 
18443. 
Milton Marks and Milton Marks, ,Jr., for Respondents. 
SHENK, .J.-The petitioners seek a writ prohibiting the 
Pnforcement of an order of the respondent superior court 
for the inspection of documents and data claimed to be in 
the records of official proceedings conducted by the Civil 
Service Commission of the City and County of San Francisco. 
An alternative writ was issued. 
In September, 1949, several hundred employees of the city 
and county, representing as well other employees similarly 
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situated, filed in the superior court a petition for the writ 
of mandate naming as respondents the city and county of 
San Francisco, its board of supervisors, and its civil service 
commission. The purpose of the petition was and is to compel 
the respondents to fix, establish and pay to each of the 
petitioners and to persons similarly situated for the fiscal 
year commencing July 1, 1949, and ending June 30, 1950, 
the rates of compensation for the respective classifications 
referred to in the petition in accordance with the requirements 
of section 151 of the charter of the city and county. 
Prior to July 1, 1949, but effective as of that date, the 
board of supervisors enacted salary standardization and 
annual salary ordinances providing for schedules of compen-
sation to be paid officers and employees whose compensations 
were subject to the provisions of section 151 of the charter. 
That section as amended in 1943 provides that schedules of 
compensation for municipal employees shall be in accord 
with the generally prevailing rates of wages for like service 
and working conditions in private employment or in other 
comparable governmental organizations in the state. The 
schedules are required to be recommended by the civil service 
commission solely on the basis of facts and data obtained in 
a comprehensive investigation and survey. The commission 
is required to ''set forth in the official records of its proceed-
ings all of the data thus obtained" on the basis of which 
it makes findings and an order whereby a rate of pay for 
each classification is recommended to the board of super-
visors. The section provides that the salaries and wages paid 
to employees shall be those fixed in the schedule of com-
pensations adopted by the board as provided by the charter 
and in accord with the provisions of the ordinance enacted 
in pursuance thereof. 
It was alleged in the petition filed in the superior court 
that the commission made such a survey; that the commission 
transmitted its findings and recommendations to the board and 
that the salary ordinance was adopted in accordance there-
with. The rates of compensation thus adopted for the several 
classifications were set forth at length. The rates of com-
pensation for employees in the same classifications in private 
employment and other comparable governmental organiza-
tions were also set forth. It was charged that the commission 
and the board disregarded the generally prevailing rates of 
wages and that the established schedules were not in accord 
with the prevailing rates for the period 1949-1950 as required 
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by the charter provisions and as alleged. The adopted rates 
as to 49 classifications, listed on a comparative basis with 
those alleged to be prevailing, were stated to be grossly less 
than rates in private and other governmental employment. 
The petitioners also sought declaratory relief and the re-
covery of the difference between the ordinance rates and the 
alleged prevailing rates in outside employment. 
The defendants answered, making certain denials and ad-
missions. The plaintiffs thereupon moved pursuant to section 
1000 of the Code of Civil Procedure for an inspection of all 
the documents, papers and data including the complete sur-
vey in connection with the preparation of the adopted wage 
schedules. A hearing was had on the motion at which the 
respondents presented evidence of the confidential nature 
of the specific data sought to be examined, and the effect of 
disclosure on the public interest. In making the wage rate 
survey the commission solicited information from private 
employers on the written promise and agreement with each 
that the source of all information supplied would be held 
in confidence, that the wage scales and other data would not 
be identified except by a code known only to the commission. 
The defendants gave testimony to the effect that but for the 
written agreements and pledges to hold in confidence the 
source of and identity of the employers furnishing the in-
formation, it would be impossible to obtain the voluntary 
cooperation of the private employers in making the survey. 
The names of nearly 200 private employers are in the record, 
as are also the lists of wage rates assumed to have been 
submitted by them ; but unprocurable except by compliance 
with the order for inspection is the data whereby to identify 
the employer submitting a specific wage list. It was also 
shown without conflict that disclosure would foment public 
disturbance and unrest in industrial employment relations and 
would interfere with the competitive activities of the employers 
in private industry. 
The trial court granted the motion for inspection and a 
stay order was entered for the purpose of permitting the 
filing of the present applications for the writ of prohibition. 
The members of the board of supervisors and of the civil 
service commission joined in filing one application (S. F. 
No. 18442), and Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, one 
of the employers affected, filed another application (S. F. 
No. 18443) for the writ to restrain the enforcement of the 
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order for im:p0etion. Numerous briefs are also' on file on 
behalf of the f'ta.te personnel hoard, various employers, and 
the Secretary of I1ahor, TJnited States Department of Labor, 
as amici curiae in support of the application for the writ of 
prohibition. 
[1] A. preliminary question relates to the basis for the 
issuance of the writ of prohibition. That writ is an appropriate 
remedy to arrest the proceedings in a court when they are 
''without or in excess of'' its jurisdiction and there is not a 
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of 
law. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1102, 1103.) 
[2] Notwithstanding the fact that the respondent court 
unquestionably has jurisdiction to grant or deny the motion 
for inspection, this court may act in a proper case when it 
appears that otherwise a failure of justice will occur in a 
matter of public importance by a wrongful or excessive exer-
cise of jurisdiction. The reviewing courts have frequently 
acted to resolve the problem on jurisdictional grounds where 
the public interest has indicated the necessity for prompt 
settlement of the issue. (See Spreckels Sugar Co. v. Indus-
trial Ace. Com., 186 Cal. 256, 260-261 [199 P. 8] ; Rodman v. 
Superior Cmtrt, 13 Cal.2d 262, 269-270 [89 P.2d 109] ; Forten-
bur·y v. S~tperior Court, 16 Cal.2d 405, 407-408 [106 P.2d 
411] ; Rescue Anny v. M~tm"cipal Court, 28 Cal.2d 460, 466-
467 [171 P.2d 8].) Thus the writ of prohibition has been 
held to lie to prevent the exercise of an unauthorized power 
in a matter as to which the subordinate tribunal has juris-
diction, no less than where the entire cause is without its 
jurisdiction; and has also been directed to prevent the en-
forcement of an order. (Evans v. Sttperior Court, 14 Cal.2d 
563, 579-581 [96 P.2d 107] and cases cited; A.belleira v. 
District Court of Appeal, 17 Cal.2d 280, 290-291 (109 P.2d 
942, 132 A..L.R. 715] .) In Franchise Tax Board v. Superior 
Court, 36 Cal.2d 538 [225 P.2d 905], the writ was issued to 
prohibit the enforcement of an order for inspection of tax 
returns; and in Kahn v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.A.pp.2d 459 
[55 P.2d 1186], the writ issued to restrain inspection of 
private documents as an unauthorized exercise of judicial 
power in a matter otherwise cognizable by the respondent 
court. 
In Coldwell v. Board of Public Works, 187 Cal. 510, 522 
[202 P. 879], claimed confidential matter had been opened 
to public inspection and it was held that it had lost its con-
fidential character; and to similar effect is People v. King, 
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122 Cal.App. 50, 57 [10 P.2d 89]. [3] Thus to leave the 
matter for possible norrection on an appeal would he too late, 
would render that remedy inadequate and would result in 
a failure of justice. (See, also, Gorbacheff v. Justice's Court, 
31 Cal.2d 178, 180 [187 P.2d 407].) 
[4] Tested by these and similar cases no good reason ap-
pears justifying the denial of the writ if otherwise the 
petitioners are entitled to protection against violation of the 
agreements of confidence. We shall not pause to consider 
whether the application filed by Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Company as one of the employers shows that it is entitled 
to the issuance of the writ. The question might be pertinent 
were that the only petitioner. But since the issuance of the 
writ in the proceeding brought by the city and county of 
San Francisco would inure to the benefit of that petitioner 
as well as all other employers who furnished information 
pursuant to the agreements of confidence, the matter does not 
require further notice. 
Section 1000 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with the 
power of the court to permit inspection of documents in the 
possession of the adverse party or under his control which 
contain evidence relating to the merits of the action. 
Section 1032 of the Political Code provides that the public 
records and other matters in the office of any officer are at 
all times during office hours open to inspection of any citizen. 
Section 1888 of the Code of Civil Procedure states that all 
written acts or records of official bodies, tribunals and public 
officers are public writings. Section 1892 of the same code 
accords every citizen the right to inspect and take a copy 
of any public writing of this state except as otherwise 
expressly provided by statute; and section 1893 requires a 
public officer to give a certified copy thereof on demand and 
payment of the fee therefor. 
Section 1881, subdivision 5, of the Code o:f Civil Procedure, 
provides the exception to the foregoing by the requirement 
that a public officer may not be examined as to communica-
tions made to him in official confidence when the public in-
terest would suffer by the disclosure. The petitioners invoke 
protection of the agreements of confidence pursuant to this 
section. 
The statutory policy of preserving official confidence in-
violate has been reeognized in appropriate cases. In Runyo·n 
38 C.2d-6 
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v. Board of Prison Terms and Paroles, 26 Cal.App.2d 183 
[79 P.2d 101], the writ of mandate was sought for the purpose 
of inspecting communications made to that board as con-
stituting public records. In denying the writ the court ob-
served the confidential nature of the information bearing upon 
applicants for parole, some of which necessarily could be 
obtained only upon the understanding that the persons giving 
the information would be protected and their communications 
treated as confidential. The record in the present case without 
conflict likewise shows that the information could not be 
obtained from the private employers solicited except upon 
the express condition and pledge that the identity of the 
source of the material would be treated as confidential. To 
like effect are Fmnchise Tax Board v. Superior Court, supra, 
36 Cal.2d 538, where every requested item of information 
was supplied with the exception of the identity of the in-
dividual taxpayers; Whelan v. Superior Court, 114 Cal. 548 
[ 46 P. 468], and People v. King, supra, 122 Cal.App. 50, 
56-57. (See, also, Opinions of the Attorney General of Cali-
fornia, vol. 1, p. 144; vol. 5, p. 145; vol. 11, p. 41; vol. 13, 
p. 180; State v. Freedy, 198 Wis. 388 [223 N.W. 861] ; Gil-
bertson v. State, 205 Wis. 168 [236 N.W. 539] ; Lee v. Beach 
Pub. Co., 127 Fla. 600 [173 So. 440] .) 
The foregoing and other cases demonstrate that the right 
of inspection may be curtailed in relation to communications 
or portions thereof where the public policy, enacted into our 
statutory law, demands that disclosure be prohibited. It 
has been well said by the United States Attorney General, 
now Justice Robert Jackson, (40 Op. Attorney General No.8, 
April 30, 1941) that the concern should be to require the 
keeping of faith with confidential informants as an indis-
pensable condition of future efficiency. The United States 
Supreme Court in Norwegian Nitrogen Prod. Co. v. United 
States, 288 U.S. 294 [53 S.Ct. 350, 77 L.Ed. 796], declared 
that although the plaintiff would be adversely affected it was 
not entitled to disclosure of information of business details, 
publication of which would reveal the identity of the manu-
facturers and might prove useful to competitors, where the 
information had been secured by public officials under pledges 
of secrecy. In United States v. Kohler Co. (E.D.Pa., 1949), 
9 F.R.D. 289, (13 Fed. Rules Serv. 33,333), voluntary state-
ments to FBI investigators were withheld from inspection 
since disclosure would seriously prejudice the future use-
fulness of the bureau and since the information was given 
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in confidence under pledge not to disclose its source. In 
Federal Life Ins. Co. v. Holod (D.C.Pa. 1939), 29 F.Supp. 
852, the Secretary of War was protected from disclosing the 
defendant's draft records. 
The courts generally have concluded that the public in-
terest in preserving confidential information outweighs in 
importance the interest of a private litigant in the absence 
of considerations involving life or liberty. In Gilbertson v. 
State, supra, 236 N.W. at 541, it was said that in all such 
situations a choice must be made between policies, each in-
dependently desirable; that not only are the courts faced 
with the necessity of making the choice, but with the extremely 
delicate question concerning the relation between the courts 
and other branches of the government ; and that the right of 
the state to preserve the secret may be superior to that of the 
litigant to compel its disclosure even though he may thereby 
be handicapped as an unavoidable consequence. It is also 
here shown by affidavits imd otherwise that the recognition 
of the right of inspection in such cases will have far-reaching 
adverse effect in other branches of government, both state 
and federal. In such other branches, as here, the desired in-
formation cannot be had at least from private employers 
without the similar agreements of confidence. Therefore, pend-
ing more thorough inquiry into the larger issues presented 
in the action, the court should not direct the respondent 
public officials to violate their agreements of confidence where 
the result may be so far-reaching and harmful and thus dis-
rupt the functions of government both local and national. 
In answer to the contention that the charter provisions 
should override the agreements of confidence and the policy 
invoked by the petitioners, it may be said that we are not 
here determining the effect of the recognition of the agree-
ments of confidence. In this proceeding we are concerned 
only with the question of the propriety of the respondent 
court's exercise of its power in granting the motion for in-
spection of the data relating to the source of the information 
agreed to be treated as confidential. There is no conflict in 
the evidence as to the adverse effect of disclosure on the 
public interest. On the evidence and the law it is concluded 
that the petitioners are entitled to have the confidential 
matter deemed privileged under section 1881 ( 5) of the Code 
of Civil Procedure and that the respondent court misapplied 
an{:! therefore exceeded its jurisdiction in granting the motion 
164 CITY & CouNTY OF S. F. v. SuPERIOR CouRT [38 C.2d 
for inspection. What may be the relation of the agreements 
of confidence to the alleged cause of action or defense is not 
a matter for consideration at this time. Questions of com-
pliance by the commission and the board of supervisors with 
the charter requirements are deemed not to be involved in this 
proceeding. 'l'hey are more properly to be treated with the 
larger issues presented in the pending mandamus proceed-
ing. It is therefore not appropriate now to declare what ap-
plication City & County of San Francisco v. Boyd, 22 Cal.2d 
685 [140 P.2d 666], may have in the solution of those issues. 
The Boyd case involved a question of compliance with the 
same charter provisions in relation to the controller's re-
fusal to pay wages in accordance with the adopted scale on 
the ground that it was higher than the prevailing rate. The 
city prevailed. 'rhe question whether compliance is sufficient 
for the purpose of establishing the validity of the wage scales 
when questioned by the employees can be decided only on the 
trial in the mandamus proceeding. Therefore consideration 
and determination of questions relating to the powers of the 
commission and the board, the effect of the agreements of con-
fidence on the existence of bases or support for the adopted 
wage scales, and the validity of the ordinances are not pre-
cluded by the language herein nor by the g-ranting of the 
writ in recognition of the official agreements of confidence. 
In view of the necessarily restricted issue here, other points 
do not require notice. 
The application for the peremptory \Yrit of prohibition is 
granted as prayed. 
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, .T., Schauer, ,T., and Sprnce, ,J., 
concurred. 
Edmonds, J., concurred in the judgment. 
CARTER, ,J.-I concur in the result but not the reasoning 
in the majority opinion. As I understand the opinion, it 
holds that the court cannot properly compel thr civil service 
commission to include, as a part of its public records, the 
names of the private employers and the information each gave 
on his wage scale, in spite of the charter provision ( § 151) 
requiring the commission to "set forth in (its) official rec-
ords of its proceedings aU of the data thus obtained," that 
is, by its investigation. That result is reached by reasoning 
that inasmuch as the commission gave a pledge of secrecy, it 
Dec.1951] CITY & CouNTY OF S. F. v. SuPERIOR CouRT 165 
[38 C.2d 156; 238 P.2d 581) 
would be ag;aim;t publie policy to compel it to divulge the in-
formation. I agrPe with that reRult. The opinion goes on 
to state, however, that it does not deeide whether the eharter 
requires the commission to inelude the information in its 
official records. It reserves that question for determination 
in the mandamus proceeding where it might be held that 
the charter provision compels those matters to be a part of 
the record, and inasmuch as the commission has not done 
so, it has not complied with the law (charter) in fixing the 
rates of pay. Thus on that ground alone the ordinance fixing 
the wage scale could be set aside. In that manner the com-
mission would be required to keep faith with its pledge of 
secrecy by the court's refusal to compel it to break its pledge, 
but still the commission or the city would suffer, for the rea-
son that all its procedure and ordinance fixing wages are a 
nullity. In other words, the city bears the brunt of the 
failure of its commission to follow the charter. 
This is an indirect approach for which I see no reason. 
'l'he charter is clear and specifies that all the data obtained 
by the commission shall be set forth in its official records, and 
it should be so held at this time. If it is believed that data 
obtained by a promise of secrecy should not be used in this 
case even though the commission had no authority to give 
sueh a pledge, the more pertinent basis for such holding is 
er:;toppel. That is to say, the one giving the information, 
having done so on the assuranee that it was confidential, may 
now claim that the city cannot reverse its position and be-
tray that confidence. If it thus will not be permitted to 
comply with the law, it follows that the wage scale cannot 
stand, for it is not based upon the public 1·ecord of the data 
obtained. 'l'he result is that the scale fixed is invalid on that 
ground alone and the trial court should be so advised to guide 
its decision in the mandamus action. 
It may be said that C-ity & County of San Francisco v. 
Boyd, 22 Ca1.2d 685 [140 P.2d 666], holds that the commission 
need not set forth the name of each private employer and his 
wage scale, but if it does it is incorrect, for it fails to consider 
the effect of such a ruling. It would mean that there could 
be no effective review of the commission's action. It is not 
elear from the face of the opinion, however, that that precise 
data was omitted from the public records of the commission 
in the Boyd case. 
My view is that the city is estopped from disclosing the 
data obtained in confidence, but the ordinance fixing the 
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wage scale, which is based upon said data, is invalid, and 
we should so hold. However, because of the pledge of secrecy 
the commission should not be required to divulge the infor-
mation and therefore its order to the contrary should be made 
ineffective by prohibition, as is done by the majority opinion. 
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied January 
15, 1952. Edmonds, J., and Carter, J., were of the opinion 
that the petition should be granted. 
[ Crim. No. 5006. In Bank. Dec. 18, 1951.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. CARYL CHESSMAN, 
Appellant. 
[1] Criminal Law-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel-Waiver. 
-An accused who of his own volition and with full knowledge 
of what he was doing waived assistance of counsel may not 
properly assert that denial of a continuance deprived him of 
a right to select counsel of his choice and deprived such coun-
sel of an opportunity to prepare, especially where the accused 
had the advisory services of a public defender throughout the 
trial. 
[2] !d.-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel-Waiver.-A defend-
ant who intelligently refuses counsel and insists upon person-
ally conducting and controlling his defense does not lose the 
status of prisoner and become entitled to extraordinary privi-
leges not accorded defendants who are represented by coun-
sel, nor does he become entitled to proceed in a manner differ-
ent from that permitted attorneys. 
[1] See 7 Cal.Jur. 939; 14 Am.Jur. 882. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Crimimil Law,§ 110; [3] Criminal 
Law, § 1067; [4] Criminal Law, § 96; [5] Criminal Law, § 264; 
[6] Criminal Law, §1353; [7] Criminal Law, §1092; [8] Crimi-
nal Law, § 464; [9, 10] Criminal Law, § 816; [11, 12] Criminal 
Law, § 1434; [13] Criminal Law, § 1418; [14] Criminal Law, § 752; 
[15] Sodomy, § 11; [16] Sodomy, § 12; [17] Criminal Law, § 809; 
[18] Criminal Law, § 1426; [19, 31] Kidnaping, § 2; [20] Kidnap-
ing, § 9; [21] Robbery, § 4; [22] Robbery, § 38; [23] Criminal 
Law,§ 358; [24] Robbery,§ 27; [25] Robbery,§ 33(1); [26] Rob-
bery,§ 48; [27] Criminal Law,§ 912(2); [28] Criminal Law,§ 614; 
[29] Criminal Law,§ 624; [30] Criminal Law,§ 348; [32] Kidnap-
ing,§ 1; [33] Criminal Law,§ 119; [34] Criminal Law,§ 144; [35] 
Criminal Law, § 1447. 
